A three-dimensional collision risk model (CRM) is being developed by the Technical University of Madrid and INECO for the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) as a method of assessing the European en-route risk, due to all causes and across all dimensions within the airspace. This model provides a method for assessing the level of safety in en-route airspaces, where controllers monitor air traffic by means of radar and provide tactical instructions to aircraft, and also provides safety metrics required to understand these results.
INTRODUCTION
EUROCONTROL is aiming at developing a collision risk model (CRM) based on radar data to provide a method for assessing the level of safety in enroute airspaces where controllers monitor air traffic by means of radar surveillance providing tactical instructions to aircraft [1] . This paper presents the work carried out by INECO and the Technical University of Madrid in order to develop a radar analysis tool, as a first step to cope with that ambitious challenge.
The goal of this software tool is to facilitate better understanding of the level of safety without having to wait until the three-dimensional CRM model account of the intervention capability of air traffic control (ATC) to monitor and prevent conflicts and hence collisions.
In the past years, great effort has been invested in the development and improvement of CRMs. Some authors have extended the original Reich model [5, 6] . Other researchers have worked on new models applied to different geographical regions (i.e. USA [7] , en-route-controlled airspace [8] ), to different flight regimes (i.e. landing on closely [9] and ultra closely spaced runways [10] ), to specific flight phases (i.e. separation between aircraft on final approach and landing [11] ), to different types of separation (vertical and longitudinal as well as lateral), and to current and future operational concepts [12] .
Nevertheless, none of the previous models is appropriate to assess and monitor the level of safety in high density en-route radar airspaces using the recorded aircraft trajectories as a sole source of input data. Traditional approaches to CRMs, generally based on statistical or probabilistic concepts, do not capture the complexity inherent to an operational radar environment such as the one in Europe, with high amount of traffic, a large number of crossing tracks, climbing and descending aircrafts, and complicated route structure. It has to be noticed that, besides its importance and potentiality for safety level assessment, not too much effort has been devoted until now to the development of CRMs based on the analysis of stored aircraft tracks that have flown in it within a given time frame.
Need for a new CRM
On behalf of the ICAO, EUROCONTROL is acting as the European Regional Monitoring Agency (EUR RMA) since reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) was implemented in Europe. The EUR RMA monitors continuously the operations on the EUR RVSM airspace and provides an estimate of the overall vertical risk for the EUR RVSM airspace. In the provision of that estimate, a CRM is used. The major constraint of this methodology is that the operational risk estimation relies on information provided by the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). This process requires full participation of controllers in the identification and reporting of altitude deviations and incident investigators in the provision of those operational reports to the RMA. This implies that the process is quite often prone to personnel changes and workload.
In the past years, EUROCONTROL has focused in the development of a comprehensive CRM that should be able to assess the operational collision risk due to all causes for current systems, including the probability that ATC together with flight crew will prevent a collision, and to complement the information of the reports collected from the states. The basis of this methodology is a three-dimensional mathematical framework (three-dimensional CRM), which is being developed since 2000 [13] .
The rationale behind the three-dimensional CRM is that aircraft collisions are extremely rare events, so their probability cannot be established by direct observation. It is therefore necessary to examine the occurrence of more frequent events that may lead to a collision. These frequent events are defined as proximate events or hazards.
A variety of definitions can be used for the terms 'hazard' and 'risk', but they may generally be considered as defined in ESSAR 4, EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement for Risk Assessment and Mitigation in air traffic management (ATM) [14] .
1. Risk: the combination of the overall probability or frequency of occurrence of a harmful effect induced by a hazard and the severity of that effect. 2. Hazard: any condition, event, or circumstance that could induce an accident.
Applying these definitions to an ATC scenario, it is accepted that hazard is closely related to situations in which the probability that two aircraft on a conflict course would not only pass closer than the prescribed horizontal and vertical separation minima, but would in fact collide.
Then the risk probability represents the probability that two aircraft in collision course do not change their course and continue on in straight flight at constant speed until they pass each other. In other words, even if ATC issues a conflict resolution in time, this is not translated into a desired change in aircraft speed, direction, or climb/descent rate ( Fig. 1 ).
BACKGROUND
As stated in reference [15] , 'accidents are dramatic examples, among other less critical events, pointing out how prospective assessment methods often poorly represent human and organizational aspects and hence limit their value for accident prevention'.
According to the above statement, a CRM should give both level of safety figures and useful safety metrics to identify 'system weaknesses' that require mitigation. These metrics are vital in explaining the variation in collision risk estimates provided by the model upon analysing different airspaces or the same airspace in different time periods.
Nowadays, ANSP and Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) mainly use ATM accident and incident databases to monitor and provide evidence of levels of safety. However, although these databases are very powerful tools and are improving constantly, they still have some weak points that need to be considered.
1. Not all incidents are reported by pilots and air traffic controllers. In fact, it is very difficult to infer how many real incidents have occurred for each one that is reported. 2. Incident severity is generally ranked solely on how close aircraft get, without considering the geometry of the event or other parameters, e.g. closure rate.
Incident classification is not homogeneous in all
databases. Furthermore, special care has to be taken to train database personnel so that the same classification criteria always apply. 4. Sometimes, the evolution of a mid-air incident is very complex, making it difficult to capture all of the information relating to this incident in a database.
A major objective of the three-dimensional CRM tool is to complement the information collected in the accident and incident databases, thereby providing:
(a) identification of all proximate events based on radar data; (b) complete classification of all proximate events using clear and consistent criteria; (c) detailed information on the evolution of each proximate event; (d) safety metrics and other air traffic factors; (e) collision risk estimate.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL CRM PROTOTYPE SOFTWARE TOOL
The aim of the three-dimensional CRM software tool under development is to analyse the radar data in order to identify all proximate events (conflicts, potential conflicts, and potential collisions) within a volume of airspace and time span, to classify them according to various criteria into classes, to estimate the frequency of occurrence, and to calculate the different parameters needed to estimate the probability of aircraft being on a collision course and the probability of ATC-loop resolution failure. The CRM software prototype has been designed to handle large volumes of flight data in an efficient way with a high level of automation. At the same time, a set of graphical interfaces allows user-friendly interaction. Visual capability has been included to the exploitation of final and intermediate results. A brief description of each module is provided below.
The three-dimensional CRM tool processes are grouped into two main functionalities that can be run independently or sequentially: the radar data processing (RDP) module and the safety metrics estimation (SME) module. The RDP module reads the radar data in the All Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance Information Exchange (ASTERIX) format, performs track segmentation, and identifies all proximate events within a selected scenario. The SME module calculates all the parameters of the mathematical model, providing estimates of the probability of collision within the scenario and several other safety metrics ( Fig. 2 ).
RADAR DATA PROCESSING
Radar and flight plan data are provided as binary text files. These files generally use the ASTERIX encoding structure.
The minimum input data required to run the threedimensional CRM prototype is contained in the radar data files, but the software tool can also use the flight plan data, if available, to optimize the performance of some of its functions (e.g. identification of military traffic). Therefore, two different submodules have been developed to perform the decoding and storage of radar track files and flight plan files.
Main preprocessing functions are to decode track data, to carry out the track segmentation, and to store and organize the required information in an efficient way in text files.
Track segmentation
The identification and analysis of potential conflicts is based on aircraft track segmentation [1] . Track segmentation identifies when an aircraft is turning, changing its vertical attitude, or modifying its speed, so as to replace the full detailed track of each aircraft with a series of line segments.
The processing of radar data poses two major challenges:
(a) the large amount of information held to represent the track followed by each aircraft; (b) the complexity of the proximate events identification and characterization, which is carried out with Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) like algorithms, determining the distance between the actual or potential (projected) position of each aircraft and the positions of all other aircraft at that moment.
Fig. 2 Three-dimensional CRM software tool
These difficulties can be simplified taking into account that, in the scenarios corresponding to 'enroute' air spaces, most aircrafts follow a regular behaviour, with 'segmented' paths. In other words, the paths are made with an ordered sequence of 'straight' sections, with punctual altitude or course changes. In addition, the speed of the aircraft in each segment is mainly uniform. To take advantage of these characteristics, a track segmentation process is implemented.
The purpose of the segmentation is to replace the track of each aircraft by a segmented line composed of a series of sections, which represent the flight path followed by the aircraft. This segmented line is characterized by a sequence of points with defined coordinates: time at which an aircraft passes a specific point and speeds for each segment.
Each point of the segmented track is complemented by some characteristics, indicating whether the aircraft is starting a turn, finishing a turn, changing attitude, rate of climb/descend, speed, etc.
The segmentation criterion is to minimize the number of segments in the trajectory that represents the path of an aircraft, while ensuring that a specified maximum error limit is not exceeded at the same time.
Proximate event identification
The main task of this function is to identify all the proximate events of a scenario. In order to perform this task, the following parameters must be introduced in the three-dimensional CRM tool.
Scenario definition. This includes time interval and
airspace boundaries of the scenario. 2. Look-ahead time (LAT ). This is the time horizon within which all aircraft positions are projected to explore the existence of 'potential conflicts'. The main purpose of the LAT is to ensure that potential conflicts are not identified by extrapolation too far into the future. However, it needs to be long enough so that no risk-bearing potential conflicts are filtered out. After several meetings with air traffic controllers and pilots and careful analysis of the literature [16] , an LAT of 10 min was initially chosen for the model. After segmentation of the paths of all aircraft in the scenario, two aircraft will be in potential conflict when the following two conditions are met at the same time.
1. The vertical separation between the projected positions of both aircraft is less than or equal to the vertical separation minimum established by H . 2. The separation in the horizontal plane between the projected positions of the aircraft is less than or equal to the horizontal separation minimum established by R.
The formulae to obtain the instant of time of minimum separation and the corresponding distance are based on the hypothesis of the aircraft flying straight and at constant speed.
SAFETY METRICS ESTIMATION
The following processes are performed in the threedimensional CRM safety metrics estimation module.
Analysis of proximate events
The three-dimensional CRM tool initially identifies all proximate events and then performs an in-depth analysis of each of them, thereby determining the following.
1. The time that the proximate event was first identified (t CI ), the predicted time of closest point of approach (CPA) (t CPA ), and other event information such as relative speeds between aircraft, real separation at that time, and vertical and horizontal separation at CPA are obtained. To illustrate the parameters calculated in the proximity analysis, Fig. 4 describes the vertical positions and attitudes of two aircraft, in potential conflict, flying on the same route. 2. Turns and changes in the speed or in the vertical attitude of the aircraft are determined. Track segmentation identifies a turn or a change in the vertical attitude or speed of the aircraft. The analysis carried out by the three-dimensional CRM tool uses the information provided by track segmentation to identify the time of a manoeuvre and stores all the parameters associated with this change: relative speeds between aircraft, real separation at that time, and new vertical and horizontal separation at the CPA (Fig. 5 ). 3. Manoeuvres performed by the aircraft to erase the potential conflict. The software tool identifies what type of manoeuvre was performed and when such actions were initiated (Fig. 6 ).
The time when two aircraft enter in conflict (t CF )
is obtained. The software tool monitors the actual separation between the aircraft and detects when they simultaneously lose both horizontal and vertical separation. The tool stores all of the information related to this event ( Fig. 7) . was triggered. 6. When the distance between a pair of aircraft increases as a function of time, the pair is said to be diverging. A diverging pair is no longer analysed, provided that the present separation is equal to or larger than the horizontal separation minima.
As a result, the three-dimensional CRM tool calculates and stores for each proximate event the time of identification of potential conflict (t CI ), start of a conflict resolution manoeuvre (t CR ), (predicted) time of entry into conflict volume (t CF ), and (predicted) time of CPA (t CPA ). It also distinguishes whether the potential conflict was resolved by an action in the horizontal or vertical plane or whether no action was taken.
Once the analysis of the proximate event is complete, the three-dimensional CRM prototype tool automatically generates a report describing the proximate event in terms of the evolution of the main parameters.
Classification of proximate events
Initially, the three-dimensional CRM tool classified the proximate events according to the following criteria: nature, traffic type, vertical regime, relative heading, and A/C reaction.
Recently, a new criterion has been developed on the basis of the activated alert system (TCAS and STCA) in the potential conflict. This information is obtained from the analysis of time-to-go to CPA.
This classification is essential to carry out the statistical analysis required by the three-dimensional CRM ( Table 1) .
Detection of activated alert systems
To characterize the severity of a conflict not just by infringement of the horizontal and vertical separation regulations -actual or potential -the threedimensional CRM software tool reproduces the logic of the TCAS to identify if and when a TCAS alert was activated.
The TCAS is based on time-to-go to CPA, rather than distance-to-go to CPA. A warning time or threshold is compared with the time-to-go to CPA, computed by dividing the slant range, between aircraft, by the closure rate. The warning time values are a function of the altitude of the aircraft. In an en-route scenario, above FL 200, the warning time of a TCAS RA is 35 s and for a TCAS TA 48 s [17, 18] .
Furthermore, the algorithms implemented in the three-dimensional CRM software tool have extended the logic of the TCAS to include the logic of the STCA system [8] .
The STCA is also based on time-to-go to CPA and normally uses a warning time of 2 min, as described in reference [19] . This threshold of 2 min can also be used to distinguish between tactical ATC actions (when a proximate event is resolved with time-to-go to CPA lower than 2 min) and strategic ATC actions (when a proximate event is resolved with time-to-go to CPA greater than 2 min).
The logic implemented in the three-dimensional CRM can be represented as follows (Fig. 8 ). A TCAS RA is activated if the kinetic and geometric characteristics of the event in the horizontal and vertical planes are in the red area at the same time.
Although the thresholds or warning times of the Alert System considered (TCAS and STCA) are fixed on the specifications of each system, a sensitivity test has been undertaken to examine the possible effects of using different values to the thresholds of the Alert System (i.e. values other than 120, 48, and 35 s). Figure 9 shows the sensitivity analysis of the identified proximate events for different values of LAT using 1 day radar data from the Maastricht Area of Responsibility (AoR).
As can be seen from Fig. 9 , the longer the LAT, the greater the number of proximate events, giving place to false detections. In the conflict detection process, certain allowances for errors are granted in both the track speed and the rate of climb, which imply the acceptance of a certain number of false alerts. This is particularly the case for early detections of proximate events when using long LATs.
Identification of ATM system weaknesses
To provide more comprehensive and accurate information on the level of safety of the selected airspace and time frame, the three-dimensional CRM tool calculates several metrics. These may be grouped in two categories:
(a) risk context metrics, which provide information on initiating events that lead to potential collisions; (b) safety metrics, which indicate the effectiveness and stress levels of safety barriers.
The risk context metrics represent traffic complexity of a selected airspace. It is defined in the threedimensional CRM model in terms of the following traffic statistics: The safety metrics provide complete information of the main characteristics associated with the proximate events identified within the selected airspace:
(a) total number of conflicts, number of potential collisions, and number of potential conflicts within the selected airspace and during a selected time period; (b) hot spots: spatial and temporal locations of proximate events; (c) classification of proximate events by:
(i) nature: conflicts, potential conflict or potential collision, passing event; (ii) traffic type: civil or military; (iii) vertical regime: level, climb, or descent; (iv) relative heading : same, opposite, or crossing; (v) A/C reaction: change vertical profile, modify heading, or change speed; (vi) activated alert system: TCAS RA, TCAS TA or STCA, or no alert; (d) percentage of potential conflicts resolved in the vertical and horizontal planes; (e) correlation between hot spots and traffic density maps; (f) overall reaction time (t 1 ): this represents the duration of the potential conflict from the first time that the potential conflict is identified (t CI ) to the conflict resolution time (t CR ) or the time of entry into conflict volume (t CF ) if no action is taken to resolve the encounter; (g) time to conflict (t 2 ): the period of time between the detection of the potential conflict (t CI ) and
Fig. 11
Overall reaction time, time to conflict, and time to CPA the (predicted) time to entry into conflict volume (t CF ); (h) time-to-go to the CPA (t 3 ): period of time between the detection of the potential conflict (t CI ) and the (predicted) time of the CPA (t CPA ) ( Fig. 11) .
As an example, using a traffic data sample of 31 days of the Maastricht AoR, Fig. 12 shows a twodimensional histogram of the time-to-go to CPA (t 1 ) and the overall reaction time (t 3 ) obtained from the analysis of radar tracks for aircraft pairs in potential conflict.
The risk context and safety metrics described earlier can be classified into three categories based on their relation with the three factors of the mathematical formulation of the three-dimensional CRM ( Table 2) . Although today clear and comprehensive thresholds for the parameters identified in the previous table are not yet available in the literature, several past studies have attempted to enlighten what could be an acceptable value for the collision risk metrics. For example, according to Ratcliffe and Ford [20] , hourly conflict rates are found to be proportional to the aircraft warning time and the number of aircraft in the study area (quadratic function) and inversely proportional to the radius of the airspace area (also quadratic). Besides some individual values, the generalized lack of clearly defined thresholds for the different safety metrics stands for the need to consolidate a methodology for safety assessment of ATM scenarios using the risk context and safety metrics calculated by the model that can be used by ATM service providers to improve safety levels in their operation.
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE 3D CRM PROTOTYPE TOOL TO MAASTRICHT RADAR DATA
For the purpose of validation, the three-dimensional CRM software tool has been applied to a radar data sample of 31 days obtained from the AoR of Maastricht Upper Area Centre (UAC). EUROCONTROL's Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre is a regional ATC centre, which provides seamless air navigation services in the upper airspace (above 24 500 ft) over a large multinational airspace in Europe, approximately 260 000 km 2 wide. An advanced and complex ATC automated system named MADAP (Maastricht Automated Data Processing and Display System) is responsible for managing, processing, and presenting in real time the information related to the air traffic flows in the whole area. The validation approach followed was inspired on validation strategies used on previous projects focus on the development of computer models to study airspace occupancy and potential collision risk encounters [21] . In the MADAP system, a unique horizontal separation standard of 5 nm is used throughout the total AoR. In the vertical plane, a separation of 1000 ft is used.
However, the conflict definition used in this study is a cylinder of radius (R) 5 nm and height (H ) 850 ft to avoid false detections of potential conflicts caused by the mode C height resolution being limited to 100 ft, which is the value of the least significant bit in the mode C altitude report. In practice, the decision to select a conflict height of 850 ft will remove from the analysis those actual conflicts caused by small deviations (less than 150 ft) in the vertical plane (passing events). The aircraft dimensions λ xy (134 ft) and λ z (40 ft) have been calculated using the length, wingspan, and height of different types of aircraft and proportions of flights made by each type, as indicated in The EUR RVSM Mathematical Supplement [22] . The selection of the value for the LAT to be used in this study was based on operational factors and was discussed with air traffic controllers and pilots. In a first approach, an LAT of 10 min was introduced in the model. However, several sensitivity analyses were performed by the three-dimensional CRM tool, revealing that this value gives a good performance in detecting conflicts (Figs 9 and 12) .
In the first stage of the processing of the 31 days of radar data, the three-dimensional CRM prototype software tool identified more than 37 000 proximate events in the en-route airspace assigned to the Maastricht UAC. A civil aircraft was involved in most of the proximate events, and in only 2.0 per cent of the cases, both aircraft were military traffic. The events involving military aircraft have been filtered out of the current analysis.
The analysis of the geometry of the potential and actual conflicts showed that the majority (59.6 per cent) of the proximate events involved one aircraft climbing and the other on level flight (i.e. events are normally located at the intersection of the main flows of traffic and between traffic in the evolution and flying level).
The analysis also showed that 72.4 per cent of the events between civil traffic are solved through actions on the rate of climb or descend (vertical reaction), 23.6 per cent through change in heading (horizontal reaction), and 3.9 per cent through actions on both vertical attitude and heading.
Additionally, all the proximate events were classified according to the activated ATC barrier when the conflict was solved, resulting that in almost 70 per cent of the events, no alert was triggered (conflicts were solved through a strategic action); in 28 per cent of the events, the STCA was activated; and only 0.3 per cent of the events were TCAS RAs. Figure 13 shows the geographical distribution of potential conflicts and the associated activated alert for a data sample of 4 days.
In order to validate the tool, more than 10 000 proximate events identified by the three-dimensional CRM tool were extracted and analysed using the MADAP raw data without finding any significant inconsistency.
Additionally, the TCAS RA events registered in the Monthly Summary of the Maastricht UAC Safety Data were compared with the results obtained from the three-dimensional CRM tool, finding that the number of TCAS RAs detected by the three-dimensional CRM tool is slightly higher because of the smoothing of the rate of climb/descent performed in the track segmentation. Nevertheless, all the registered TCAS RAs were captured, and the algorithms of the track segmentation method maintain a maximum error limit, which guarantees that all the detected situations were at least very close to the TCAS RA boundaries.
Fig. 13
Example of potential conflict geographical distribution of activated alert systems
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a new and innovative tool as a first step for building up a three-dimensional CRM to assess aircraft safety level within European Airspace based on the process and analysis of radar tracks. The three-dimensional CRM tool has been designed to complement the information collected in the accident and incident databases, thereby providing the following information inferred from the in-depth assessment of proximate events:
(a) identification of all proximate events based on radar data; (b) complete classification of all proximate events using clear and consistent criteria; (c) detailed information on the evolution of each proximate event; (d) safety metrics and other air traffic factors.
The paper describes the three-dimensional CRM tool developed to carry out this assessment, describing its main functions and modules. The technical details and methodologies used in the assessment are explained, and the major outputs are presented to illustrate the potential of en-route radar data exploitation for collision risk modelling. Further work should be carried out to:
(a) apply the three-dimensional CRM also to traffic samples of different airspaces and extend the principles of three-dimensional CRM from en-route to Terminal Manoeuvring Area scenarios; (b) develop a methodology to provide a complete risk picture of the scenario, to identify the ATM system weakness, and to characterize the performance of the safety barriers, using all the information provided by the three-dimensional CRM tool that could be used by ATM service providers to monitor and improve safety levels in their operation; (c) complete an analytical model based on the threedimensional CRM also to provide true collision risk values.
